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CATEGORIAL ANALYSIS OF A. KURPATOV’S
"METHODOLOGY OF THOUGHT"
IN CONTEXT OF PERSPECTIVE AGI1 DEVELOPEMENT
”When we establish a considered classification,
when we say that a cat and a dog resembe each other
less then two greyhounds do even if both are tame
or embalmed, even if both are frenzied,
even if both have just broken the water pitcher,
what is the ground on which we are able to establish the validity
of this classification with complete certainty?”
Foucault M. The Order of Things.
Abstract. In the article we apply language of category theory in order to formalize
core methodological principles that structure the methodology of thought elaborated
by Russian modern psychiatrist and philosopher A. Kurpatov. According to the
author such formalization could be useful both from the standpoint of unification
of ways of thinking about brain functioning and reasoning in particular, and from
the standpoint of search of uniform language of scientific thought in general.
Preliminary remarks
The task we are eager to solve within the limits of declared theme of
present research can be formulated as follows: to mathematize core principles
of brain’s work. We will proceed from the assumption that human’s brain is
extremely effective machine capable of decision making in situations with
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radical incompleteness of information. This is so by very the same brain’s
construction which has been justified and is still justifying itself in a process
of natural selection.
It doesn’t mean however that given evolutionary construction at all flawless.
But provided we clearly understand the genesis of these flaws they could be
seen as certain specificity in work of this instrument which just needs to be
taken into consideration. Further still, this specificity emerged by no means
randomly, but rather as one of the possible nature’s solutions of the problem
of speed in decision making, which was solved precisely by means of sacrifice
of precision (truth) - quite a legitimate move, statistically speaking.
Therefore, when trying to build general artificial intelligence it would
be productive not to emulate human’s central nervous system, but rather to
reproduce those abstract principles that are implemented in brain’s cognitive
activity, i. e. its ways of information processing, deduction or making decisions
considered as neutral with regard and neurobiological characteristics of living
tissue.
At the time, Andrey Kurpatov, eminent Russuian psychotherapist and
philosopher, carried out immense scientific work describing patterns of human
thought in highly abstract terms. His early theoretical writings - ’Philosophy
of psychology’ and, especially, ’Tractatus psychosophicus’ - are written exactly
in this way. In these investigations he uses (as he calls it) "referentless"concep-
tual apparatus which grasps brain functioning not as a system of specific
nerve tracts, but rather as a matrix of regularities, sort of logic of occurring
processes.
Earlier we already tried to "translate"basic ideas of Kurpatov’s "Tractatus"
into the category theory language2 in order to experiment with the appropriate-
ness and usefulness of categorial formalism in interdisciplinary research
2Егорычев И. Э. Категорный анализ текста А. В. Курпатова "Tractatus
psychosophicus"в контексте перспективных разработок AGI.
2
related to AGI development. Since this work turned out to be quite satisfactory,
so in present research we address to yet another one of Kurpatov’s latest
theoretical texts called "Methodology of Thought. A Draft where specific
character of psyche’s action once again expressed referentlessly - as some
kind of "informal logic of processes".
“In order to express this logic, - Kurpatov writes – we will need following
invariants: “intellectual function”, which describes all possible operations in
the given system, “intellectual object”, by which we have in mind any particular
wholeness that can be singled out in the space, as well as “entity”, which we
need exactly for uncovering these particular “intellectual objects”.3
So, as distinct from “principles” of “Philosophy of Psychology”, “things”
and their "relations"of “Tractatus Psychosophicus in this present case we will
have to formalize quite different set of concepts (“invariants”): “intellectual
object”, “intellectual function”, “entity” and, as we shall see below - “invariant”
itself.
Let us start with a little deeper plunging in the context: Kurpatov insists
that methodology of knowledge (scientific theory) could be efficacious only
if a) it is non-referential; and b) all its non-referential elements are defined
through each other.
Although I do not believe that this task could be accomplished entirely as
long as even such highly formalized sciences as mathematics and physics are
forced to operate with so called primitive, or indefinable notions4 (number,
set, point, mass, time etc.), theory’s usage of maximally general notions with
minimum of content is totally legitimate - we witness it with the plenty of
evidence during all history of development of human thought as such. But to
have a precise grasp on how a certain notion works within particular theory
we definitely need a context.
3Kurpatov A. “Thought. Systematic investigation”. - SPb, 2019. P.131
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primitive_notion
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Following Kurpatov, in our investigation we want, on the one hand, to rely
on scientific results of present day neurophysiology, and try not to contradict
them in those hypotheses which can not be confirmed at the moment. On
the other hand, we want more - we want to handle human thought as
"a process of manipulating with intellectual objects while sought by very
same neurophysiology one-to-one correspondence between the set of states
of neurons with the set of so called mental content (which later we will call
"world of intellectual function) is far from being established. Moreover, this
task may never be accomplished. From this being said, however, it does not
follow that we tend to consider mind as some sort of independed substance,
tabooed for any kind of systematic research. Allow me to quote "Methodology
of Thought"once again (as readers may guess we will address to this text
quite often): "Modern physiology looks a lot like invention of telescope in
astronomy or invention of microscope in biology: it investigates organ that
produces mentality that, in its turn, produces consciousness".5 (My italics. -
I. E.). In other words, from the very beginning we deliberately place ourselves
on a footing of some fixed materialistic theory of consciousness, or cybernetic
reductionism, if you will. From such point of view all manifest "phenomenology"
is interpreted as user illusion, while consciousness itself is considered a virtual
machine installed on material substrate that has been "shaped"by evolutionary
algorithm in a very special way. Computer metaphor we use seems even more
relevant in case we set a goal to apply Kurpatov’s "invariants"in computer
science. Let’s see in more detail what does it give us.
By virtual machine computer scientists normally understand a software
(list of instructions) installed on some real machine B (on a computer - an
actual hardware made of silicon chips, capacitors and wires and so forth) in
order to perfectly emulate another real machine A. As philosopher Daniel
Dennett once put it: "A virtual machine is what you get when you impose
5Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 28
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a particular pattern of instructions (more literally, dispositions) on a real
machine that has lots of plasticity—interacting parts that can be in many
different states."6 For example, on Macintosh computer we can use software
programs that run only on Mac OS operating system. And if you have a
valuable software program written for IBM PC it won’t run on your Mac.
Instead one can install on her Mac specially developed software (Parallels
Desktop, for one) which will replicate IBM physical architecture, on which
appropriate operating system (Windows) can be installed, on which any
programs written for "real IMB"will run.
In more extended sense we could call virtual machine both operating
system itself and any software program at all which turns our hardware
computer into calculator, or CD player, or God knows what else. All those
programs don’t imitate any actual hardware but create another virtual machine
that obeys certain rules, accepts certain inputs etc.
As a result, the main advantage of such extended VMM (virtual machine
metaphor) lays in very important option to repeat this "imitation game"with
visualization several times. Here is another clarifying example from computer
programming: after famous Java Virtual Machine (JVM) were created, software
developers got a chance to write so called Java applets - small,integrated
directly into the web page, software applications which considerably diversified
interactive repertoire of internet websites. These applets includes crosswords,
online games, maps, charts and so forth and all of them are written on Java
programming language who’s source code would be executed on appropriate
JVM regardless of which operating system your hardware’s running on -
appropriate JVM either already is or would be automatically downloaded
once you visit certain web page. Sun Microsystems when entering the market
with it’s revolutionary product even came up with the special slogan WORA
(Write Once, Run Anywhere) to emphasize exactly this extremely useful
6Dennett, Daniel C.. Intuition Pumps And Other Tools for Thinking (p. 134).
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aspect of virtualization.
Now, let’s imagine online chess game that is written in Java code that
is executed by Java Virtual Machine that is running on Mac OS operating
system that is installed on your MacBook. The whole construction can be
viewed as machine MacBook pretending to be a MacOS machine pretending
to be a Java virtual machine pretending to be Java syntactic machine pretending
to be a chess machine.
In other words we have four virtual machines and one real machine that
successively imitate each other. What in important here is that while moving
chess figures with the cursor we fall a victim of multilevel illusion - user
illusion. Because on hardware level there are no any "chess figures’, "cursors’,
"programming languages"or even "strings of ones and zeros"that compose
"words"of machine code - there IS only a sequence of alternating with mind
blogging speed states of those silicon semiconductors and a flow of electric
charge running in a particular fashion through metal wires and conductive
layers inside microprocessor.
From such "computer metaphoric"point of view, the main difference between
mental organization of human and mentality of any other animal is that
former arises as a product of cultural evolution which allows for "installation"on
human brain of a huge number of words and other thinking tools (information
structures). These information structures eventually form cognitive architecture
(top down) radically different from cognitive structure of animals (bottom
up). By supplying human minds with the system of redundant multiple
representations this architecture equips us (humans) with the privileged perspective
from which we get limited and biased access to machinery of our brain
(of our whole body, to be more precise). Results of these brain workings
we involuntary mistakenly attribute either to properties of external world
(colors, odors, sounds...) or to internal personal dispositions and responses
(expectations, desires, emotions...) All those "familiar things"constitute "world
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of intellectual function "scheme of world"and complimentary ’scheme of me’ -
if we use "Tractatus Phychosophicus"conceptual apparatus7, or "user interface’
- if we use just introduced computer metaphor.
User interface of any software application exists in order to make functions
of this application available to users (people) who don’t and don’t have to
know all technical details of how their computers work. User illusion stored
in our brains exists for the same reason - it makes our functions available
to some extent to users (other people) who don’t and don’t have to know
all intricate details of how our brains work. But the same applies and to us:
when we get to use it ourselves our position is not privileged - we are the
same guest users in our own brains as anybody else.
Italicized "to some extent"is not an accident: it is extremely important.
Since from the above it follows that need in clear cut representation of
someone’s behavior, from evolutionary standpoint, presupposed need in communication,
we must emphasize: Darwinian creature that communicate all her states
and/or intentions to all hearers will be soon extinct. That’s why evolution of
communication must be seen as strategic communication which first of all is
not entirely linguistic and second - grounded in deception and manipulation
rather than purely cooperative behavior. Thus, what must evolve is a gap,
necessarily emerging as a result of such controlled communication - a buffer,
where actual goals and intentions could be doctored enough to be safe for
broadcasting. This particular buffer, we must assume, formed the basis for
"private workspace"that we now call consciousness.
And final very important point. When viewing consciousness as a virtual
machine composed of virtual machines composed of virtual machines etc
installed on brain’s neural substrate we must understand at the same time
that unlike in the case with computer monitor facing end user precisely
the latter is final beneficiary/victim of user illusion. In the model where
7Курпатов А. Психософический трактат.М. 2007. P. 37
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ourselves are end users (our brains, to be precise) the instance of monitor is
superfluous. We will come back to this important issue later, but for now let us
underline once again: while scrupulous understanding of neural interactions
on molecular level is important scientific goal our present investigation mainly




“Human beings have only a weak ability
to process logic, but a very deep core capability of
recognizing patterns.”
Kurzweil R. How to Create a Mind
As any other living thing we, humans, preoccupied with self preservation.
Strongly generalizing one can say that self preservation directly depends on
anticipation, hence will be the more effective the more competitive future
will generate given self preserving system. as highly evolved creatures for
these purposes we use highly evolved apparatus (that allows us not only
to duck in time after someone threw a stone at us, but also to short our
stocks in time, after we more or less accurately predicted a decline in oil
futures prices) which we conventionally will call "mental apparatus". We say
"conventionally"keeping in mind that there are more then a few schools of
thought on that matter. As for us, by "mental"we,standing on materialistic
position of sorts, understand an aspect which is worth distinguishing in neural
activity (or rather, effect that is produced by such activity), i. e. virtual
machine, implemented during evolutionary process on material medium that
met with certain requirements. By "certain requirements"we understand the
following: just as the wheel being a piece of technology requires preexistence
of certain specifically developed surfaces (rails, paved roads for its implementation,
so the virtual machine of human mind can be deployed only in such "ecosystemwhere
besides language and social interaction writing plays a major role, as well as
charting, mapping, diagramming and other endowers of potential intelligence8,
so they could be used to unload many auxiliary virtual machines into the very
8P.99
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same ecosystem. These virtual machines then can be downloaded from the
ecosystem to the individual brain by demand through ability to learn, which
presupposes considerable prototypical plasticity of the brain, which in turn
is another requirement that needs to be met by this "real machine".
Wheel, scissors, number, long division, alphabet, justice, French language,
music, color coding - all of them are intellectual objects, bearers of potential
intellect, virtual machines, applets, who’s source code can be executed by
virtual machine of our mind. But on the lowest levels of virtualization each of
these objects is just some "primitive"specific complex of neural interconnections
capable of initiating certain behavior (response): difference that makes a
difference. Actually, each one of these complexes is exactly a one thing -
of those the world presents itself by. 9 As Kurpatov writes himself: "In effect,
this "object of thought"is nothing but separate cortical columns and reflex
arcs, connected ("consolidated") as single neural complexes."10
This view on "units of thought"agrees very nicely indeed with the results
of modern neurobiology. So called columnar organization of the cerebral
cortex for the first time was discovered and characterized by American neuro-
physiologist Vernon Benjamin Mountcastle in the 1950s. He observed remarkably
unvarying, repeated structure of neocortex and hypothesized that it was
composed of cortical columns as its basic units.11 There are about a half
million cortical columns in a human neocortex, each occupying a space about
two millimeters high and a half millimeter wide and containing about 60 000
neurons. Later research showed that each column also consists of repeated
functional fragments of nervous tissue ( about a hundred neurons) united by
similar task - to encode and recognize some relatively primitive pattern, or
form. That’s why now strucrural unit of neocortex defined as said minimal
9Proposition 1 of "Tractatus Phychosophicus".
10Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 72
11V. B. Mountcastle, “An Organizing Principle for Cerebral Function: The Unit Model
and the Distributed System” (1978).
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pattern recognizer, while Mountcaste column which is just an aggregate of
pattern recognizers called either hyper- or macrocolumn 12. So, there are on
the order of 30 billion neurons or about 300 million pattern recognizers in
total in the neocortex.
Kurpatov suggests to consider any intellectual objects as always-already-
derived from other, more simple intellectual objects: "It would be a mistake
to assume presence of some initial (primitime, elementary) intellectual objects.
First of all, we must understand that every intellectual object, even the
most "simple"one, aggregates from different, separate stimuli (which affect
different, separate receptors). Second of all, all these intellectual objects
get their appropriate status (disposition, weight, value, sounding) - that of
’intellectual object no sooner than at the moment we endow this intellectual
object with some "essence’ - in other words, perceive it in some kind of
relation with ourselves (where "our-self"considered as any mental content
whatsoever), as a "thing"that has certain "meaning-for-me".13
Here we must pay attention to several important points at once: first,
intellectual object’s relation "with me"does not presuppose any awareness of
it, or it’s representation in consciousness - it should be enough if something
would be perceived, differentiated in extent sufficient for this "something"would
be taken into account somehow, would make a difference in the future.
But, of course, composite intellectual objects may well be represented in
consciousness. Second, because, as we mentioned earlier, the main task of
cognition is forecasting, or fabrication of the competitive ("farther-sighted")
future, the overall presentation of perceived intellectual object will depend on
our predisposition,or, as phenomenologists would say - on our intentionality14.
12https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortical_column
13Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 38
14Intentionality, in phenomenology, the characteristic of consciousness whereby it is
conscious of something i.e., its directedness toward an object.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/intentionality-philosophy
"Experiences are intentional. This being-directed-toward is not just joined to the
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To put it differently - expectation affects perception. Something very similar
we find in "Tractatus Psychosophicus": "I do not determine a meaning of
the thing deliberately - it is determined by what thing [meaning] is I to
myself. Hence: meaning of myself [thing] is always some need that forces me
[meaning] to develop a certain thing [meaning] from the World"15 And third:
the very process of thought, for Kurpatov, is not a mind movement, not a
"successive transition"from one set of propositions to another (whatever it
means), but rather a construction of suitable intellectual object.
Ray Kurzweil, who we quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, and who,
while working in Google for more than eight years by now, consistently and
successfully uses his own theory of mind which based on hierarchical pattern
recognition, expresses a surprisingly similar thought: "To do logical thinking,
we need to use the neocortex, which is basically a large pattern recognizer.
It is not an ideal mechanism for performing logical transformations, but it is
the only facility we have for the job."16
Describing the differences between the algorithm of the computer program
that defeated World chess champion Garry Kasparov in 1997 and the way
of playing chess of the Grand Master, Kurzweil notes that DeepBlue was
capable of analyzing the logical implications of 200 million board positions
per second. Kasparov, on the other hand, when asked how many positions he
could analyze each second, said that it was less than one. But Kasparov
new and remembered about 100 000 board positions and compared the
situation that he sees at the moment to all 100, 000 board situations that
he has mastered, and he does all 100 000 comparisons simultaneously17. A
experience by way of a mere addition, and occasionally as an accidental reaction,
as if experiences could be what they are without the intentional relation. With the
intentionality of the experiences there announces itself, rather, the essential structure of
the purely psychical". - Edmund Husserl
15Kurpatov А. Tractatus Psychosophicus.. - М, 2007. P. 36
16Kurzweil, R. How to Create a Mind. Penguin Publishing Group. London. P.96
17There really is a scientific consensus on this point: all of our neurons are processing the
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typical medical specialist makes about the same number of operations of
pattern comparison/differentiation when she diagnose a patient - he compares
discovered symptoms of particular patient with about 100 000 learned characters
of illness. Generally speaking, any professional, when solving any intellectual
or creative problem, does the same - in order to become a true specialist (
to learn this many chunks of knowledge) she needs those notorious 10 000
hours of deliberate practice in chosen domain.
Thus, we see that both Kurpatov and Kurzweil strip the cognition of
traditionally attributed dynamics - it is more like "pending"in uncertainty
which is almost literally abolished (in Gegel’s sense of the German word
Aufheben) as soon as suitable pattern has been recognized (suitable intellectual
object has been constructed).
Taking into account everything mentioned above it is fair to say that
even the most elementary intellectual object is indeed not that elemental
and really is derived from at least three "elements:
- a set of data (А);
- myself as "the world that presented itself to me as me"(Ω);
- relation with me, which is, generaly speaking, is the function of my
internal state/expectation (f).
From now on, every time we will use the term "intellectual object we will




Speaking formally, А and Ω - are "objects"of some sort, and an "arrow"−→
patterns at the same time.
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- is a functional relation. We can see that the whole construction, although
it consists of three so called self-sufficient objects, at the same time appears
as a certain integrity: relation is always given by some rule, but at the same
time the source and the target of the rule are also constitutive for the relation
itself. That’s why the whole diagram can be regarded in several aspects:
- with an emphasis on the source object where the arrow departs from -
as an illustration of the fact that object A, as part of the relation, is never
given to me "in itself"and comprise data that also are not given but rather
taken.
- with an emphasis on the target object where the arrow arrives to - in
order to make clear that perceived essentially depends on the perceiver. In
case an arrow ends in different subject of experience it would be another
relation and completely another object;
- with an emphasis on the arrow - in order to show that relation is
essentially a process;
- finally, with an emphasis on the whole diagram as on new, self-sufficient
object of some sort that was formed by two halves of relation.
Sometimes, to make more distinct that it is the relation that is constitutive
for the whole construction we will write: f : A −→ Ω.
Data that comprise the set A also , generally speaking, are intellectual
objects. Collection of data which belong to the set A as its elements also,
generally speaking, are composed intellectual objects. But we must start
somewhere, so we will proceed from assumingly “primitive” elements x, y ∈
A, keeping in mind that their “primitiveness” is merely an assumption that
strongly depend on context.
We must pay special attention to the set Ω as well,because in our construction
it will play very specific role - that of the instance of experience (in a sense
of affectation). In this subject of experience we will be interested most of all
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in his ability of differentiation. Thus, the structure of object Ω which models
subject’s ability of differentiation must satisfy certain requirements: first of
all, it must be a partially ordered set, so to its elements could be assigned
more or less high values. That is, a candidate set for Ω must have a partial
order structure.18 In other words, we will use Ω as an existential scale - or
simply a ruler, that will measure the differences.19
Now let’s try to understand more clear what kind of differences elements
of set A can have and how we can measure these differences. Referring
to the Kurpatov’s text once again: "Our mind leans irresistibly to sum
up all collection of stimuli into one comprehensible, lucid and supposedly
consistent view on reality, i. e. to create a "reality effect". This representation
of reality is in fact some sort of filter-interpreter - every new stimulus,
when caught by, figuratively speaking, gravity field of certain representation
system, inevitably changes its trajectory, so to speak - some of them are
repulsed (are ignored), some other, complimentary, are attracted, while some
other still are modified (interpreted) in order to fit in existent viewpoint."20
As we already mentioned earlier all said above grasps very well with a
concept of expectation: on every level of perception - from the most primitive,
genetically determined21 ability for differentiation to utterly conscious, abstract
concept - we in fact deal with situation, with some expected state of affairs.
Respectively, we expect from the elements of the whole situation that they
18Every interaction (relation), although it has infinite number of modalities, always can
be characterised in terms of intensities of these modalities. And these intensities are
partially ordered. See Egorychev I. "Categorial analysis of "Tractatus Psychosophicus"
19With the values of this ruler we as well might want to do set theoretic operations of union
and intersection - it will endow our set of existential values with some basic “logic”. See
Egorychev I. Comments to categorial analysis of "Tractatus Psychosophicus"
20Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 57
21"If we look into the studies on development of face (muzzle, beak) recognition skill which
forms in early infancy almost in all animals with relativity large brain we will see that
brain tends to develop strong habits of perception based on some sort of instinctive,
genetically predisposed preferences."Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft".
SPb, 2018. P. 73
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will appear in it as this or that. As a result, it makes sense to say to what
extent every element included into intellectual object A is, first - different
from itself (in a sense of what we expect to see in it’s place) and second - to
what extent this particular element is relevant to the whole situation, i. e.
how close is it to the other elements that were discerned in this situation.
Hereinafter we will say that there is a function of expectation ExpA :
A×A→ Ω determined on set A which for every two elements x, y ∈ A assigns
a degree of their coherence (proximity) q on existential partially ordered scale
Ω so that ∀a, b, c ∈ A:
ExpA(a, b) = ExpA(b, a)
ExpA(a, b) ∧ ExpA(b, c) ≤ ExpA(a, c)
We see that these two imposed conditions are quite weak and they become
even more comprehensible when we try to interpret the degree of difference
(or - proximity) topologically - as proximity in space - and we will measure
it as a distance. then our conditions will take a form of axioms of metric22
with the only difference that proximity of intellectual object to itself don’t
have to be maximal. Degree of coherence of intellectual object with itself can
be understood as degree of proximity to it’s own essence (or participation
in Idea in Platonic sense) and denoted as EssA(x) We will talk more about
essences below.
Weakness of axioms of such generalized metric turns out to be extremely
convenient also because these axioms are satisfied by whole class of functions
and variability on them can easily be interpreted as variation of internal state
of the subject of experience.
Moreover, we see as well that all those degrees will have necessarily local
character: the same element x ∈ A can be measured as more or less coherent
22https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metric_(mathematics)
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depending on nature of the context it is being experienced in, on expectations
being laying down (mostly unconsciously) on the situation as a whole23, as
well as on internal state of the subject of experience.
Several examples are to follow which, from our standpoint, could significantly
clear up suggested formalism.
First example we will borrow again from Ray Kurzweil’s book "How
to create mind". Let us remind to all that in accordance with his pattern
recognition theory of mind (PRTM) human neocortex is intricately organized
hierarchy of modules each one of which on it’s own level is responsible for the
recognition of patterns of certain type - from, let’s say, inclined bar in some
graphic character to such highly abstract concepts as irony or justice. It is
important to to keep in mind that this hierarchy precisely is the hierarchy of
concepts (of intellectual objects) rather then hierarchy of neural complexes
that comprise the recognition module itself, because on hardware level the
construction of neocortex is only one pattern recognizer high. That’s why
said hierarchical structure forms not as a result of physical building up of
one module above another, but as complex network of neural interconnections
which develops in one’s ontogenesis. Let’s look on some standard fragment
of network hierarchy of pattern recognizer of written text which consists of
three levels:
23such unconscious expectations often called beliefs, i. e. certain set of basic convictions,
of faith in that all objects have weight, inability of humans levitate without technical
support of some sorts etc. In his "Tractatus Psychosophicus"Andrey Kurpatov called
them "outposts of faith".
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Elements of letters, whole letters, words - all these are patterns recognized
by a module of corresponding level. Each pattern recognizer has number of
inputs, a "processor"for recognizing of symbols and unique output. Once
lower level modules have recognized their "objects"and sent appropriate
signals to the above "floor module of this floor also sends signal that the
object it was "responsible"of just has been recognized. Different signals are
assigned with different "weights"and some other parameters - such as size
of the input signal, as well as variability in this size. If we take phonemes
as example of patterns to be recognized then when perceiving someone’s
articulation of two words "steep"and "step"the expected size of vowel sound
"E"in first case will be bigger then in second, as well as expected variability
of this size. because normally sound "E"in word "steep"considered as a
long vowel although different people may articulate it differently. Sound
"E"in word "step"will have smaller expected size, but also a large degree
of variability as soon as it still can be pronounced as a long sound. However,
we can’t say the same about consonant sounds "S"and "T"in the same two
words - they will have both small expected sizes and small variability of that
size.
We see that "size"in this case means duration of sound, but many other,
much more abstract quantities can be coded in the same dimension - such
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as sympathy, pleasure, grief etc.24.As Kurzweil notes himself: "We can draw
similarities across rather diverse continuums, as Darwin did when he related
the physical size of geological canyons to the amount of differentiation among
species."(My italics. - I. E.)25
The key point of this example is that module’s inputs of a given level
receive signals not only from the lower levels, but also from modules positioned
higher in hierarchy. And what is more important that input of the latter
in summary response could be even more significant. significant. If we are
reading from left to right, for example, the word "evolution"and have already
recognized all the letters except the last one, the "evolution"recognizer will
predict that it is likely to see an “N” in the next position and will send
appropriate signal down to the "N"recognizer "saying"that probability to
encounter letter "N"is very high. So"N"recognizer adjusts its threshold such
that it is more likely to recognize an “N” even if it was smudged or printed
poorly and wouldn’t be recognized in normal circumstances.
In this way neocortex permanently produces the future on every level
of its hierarchy. On highest conceptual levels we also busy with predictions:
“Who is going to walk through this door? "What someone is likely to say
next? "What I expect to see when I turn the corner? "What wold be the
likely results of my own actions? and so on.
At that we are making mistakes quite often, mostly because our brain
by its construction identifies absence of disproof or nonconfirmation with
confirmation26, hence our recognition thresholds are lowered by default. Thought,
24We will come back to this important feature of human brain later, when we will talk
about invariants and universals
25Here Kurzweil alludes to the central idea articulated by Charles Lyell in his main work
on geology "Principles of Geology"(1830) from which Darwin heavily borrowed when
elaborated his own theory.
Kurzweil, R. How to Create a Mind. Penguin Publishing Group. London. P.116
26You do remember priority of speed over precision, don’t you? We must also keep in mind
that absence of information "costs"much less than information about an absence.
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by and large, could be reduced to sending somehow consciously manageable
inhibitory signals down to our lower level recognition modules thereby forcing
them to ask for more data to confirm from their "subordinates".
Andrey Kurpatov makes the same point: "So, for example, if I consider
some state a "potential adversary"I necessarily interpret its political actions
as hostile, and i will need to make a huge, focused effort to discern in these
actions something different."
Neurophysiology also agrees that perception can not be explained as
strictly upward process. We rather have some sort of recursive "hermeneutic
circle"of hypotethis generation on upper levels and their testing on lower
levels. According to this kind of theories of perception percieving subject
is building her actual, constantly renewing model of the world in cycles. In
such a cycle one’s current needs, expectations and interests shape hypotheses
for one’s perceptual systems to confirm or disconfirm, and a rapid sequence of
such hypothesis generations and confirmations produces theu ltimate product,
the ongoing,updated "model"of the world of the perceiver.
We would like to emphasize once again that needs must be understood in
maximally abstract, phenomenological sense - as intentionality, some specifically
shaped interest, "being-directed-toward..". A. Kurpatov also draws our attention
to this: "It would be weird to speak about "need"in mathematical calculations,
or about "need"in search for truth, or about "need"in music. But nevertheless,
within the framework of internal psychic mechanics itself this is actually
the "needs": solving of intellectual problems - mathematical, philosophical,
psychological, problems of social communication or of aesthetic pleasure and
so on - for the mind they all do not differ from solving problem of satisfying
physiological needs.27
Prominent and highly honored by me researcher of consciousness Daniel
Dennett points out that mentioned earlier generate-and-test theory of perception
27Kurpatov A. “Thought. Systematic investigation”. - SPb, 2019. P. 55-56
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explains very well not only normal brain functioning, but also sheds some
light onto the nature of hallucinations: all we need here for an otherwise
normal perceptive machine to be thrown into hallucinatory mode is for
hypothesis-generation (expectation-driven) side to operate normally, while
perception (data-driven) side of the cycle goes into random or arbitrary
round of confirmations and disconfirmations. In other words, if noise in
the perceptive channelwould be arbitrarily amplified into"confirmations "and
"disconfirmations"about intellectual object on cernain level being percirved,
the current expectations, concerns, obsessions, and worries of the subject
will lead to framing questions28 or hypotheses whose content is guaranteed
to reflect those dominant interests, and so a quite freakish perceptual picture
might unfold in the perceptual system, strictly speaking, without an author.
To elaborate on this theme we could hypothesize that notoriously famous
Elizabeth Loftus’s "false memories"might have the analogous structure - as
soon as our main concern is not the past, but mostly the competitive future
it is quite natural to assume that we must be interested in images from the
past merely as in "lessons of history"of some sort, pieces of which might be
useful in building this future. It’s no wonder then that some parts of this
construction would be assembled, as one might say, "quick and dirty": "It
would be unreasonable simplification to call this process "mirroring"as soon
it is not mirror image of what’s real, but sort of it’s recreation, production."29
Let’s turn back to introduced earlier function of expectation. French
philosopher Alain Badiou uses the same mathematical construction when
he tries to to make a distinction between ontology and phenomenology and
speaks about logic of appearance. He illustrates very gracefully his main thesis
with the example of Paul Dukas’s opera "Ariadne and Bluebeard". First of
all, Badiou notes that precisely proper names "Ariadne"and "Bluebeard"make
28https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framing_effect_(psychology)
29Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 72
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possible appearing by means of discrete, generally speaking, situations (musical,
scenic or narrative): Ariadne before knowing Bluebeard, the first encounter
between Ariadne and Bluebeard, Bluebeard the murderer, Bluebeard the
child, Ariadne freeing the other wives, Bluebeard and Ariadne’ sexual encounter
etc. Appearing of characters of these two is in no way regulated by, as
Badiou puts it, "genealogical constructions required in order to fix within
the real the referent of these proper names". Just as the peripeteia that
affect Bluebeard and Ariadne presuppose that material referents of their
names remains the same, but this "same"does not ever appear, being strictly
reduced to the names.30 Appearing, on the other hand, grasps only in a form
of series of transcendental values which measure the extent of self-difference,
as well as the difference from the others in different situations (love, sex,
death, the dream of freedom) and amounts to explicating in which sense,
situation by situation, Ariadne is something other than ‘Ariadne’ as captive
of Bluebeard, Bluebeard something other than ‘Bluebeard’ than a sinister
maniac, but also how Ariadne is something other than Bluebeard’s other
wives, even though she is also one of them. It’s quite obvious that when we
evaluate the last difference we must take into consideration the fact that
Ariadne, unlike other wives, is clearly aware of her position and does not
want to accept it. Other five of his wives, on contrary, can be substituted
with one another in their relationship to Bluebeard and in this sense they are
"transcendentally identical which is what marks their ‘choral’ treatment in
the opera. Following the same logicr of appearing, we immediately know how
to evaluate Bluebeard in love with Ariadne and in result finding it impossible
30Badiou A. Logics of worlds. N. Y. 2009. C.116. It is interesting to compare this
thought with the Kurpatov’s text selection: "If they tell me: "Saint Jerome"or "Great
Caravaggio but there is no neither these intellectual objects in my individual world of
intellectual function, nor adjacent to them - such as "religion "saints "artists"with their
possible "greatness appropriate information simply won’t be accepted, it would be like
talking to the brick wall. Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018.
P. 94-95
22
to treat Ariadne like the other women, and thus stands outside of what is
implied by the referential being of the name ‘Bluebeard’. Bluebeard is not
"Bluebeard so value of function Ess(Bluebeard) = µ i. e. minimal. Again,
within the opera this limit value corresponds precisely to the extravagant
fact that for the duration of the last act Bluebeard remains on the stage, but
does not sing or speak a single word: Bluebeard is absent from himself.
All of the above gives hope that given mathematical model which has
been chosen for the concept of intellectual object to be formalized has been
chosen correctly and quite fully satisfies the requirements for it.
So,from now on, by intellectual object we will understand quite intricately
constructed, synthetic object A := (A,ExpA), comprising set of data А and
function of expectation ExpA : A×A→ Ω, which depends essentially on the
subject of experience and her internal state. In mathematics such object А
called Heyting-valued set, or, since values of function ExpA belongs to Ω -
an Ω-set, while the collection of all objects of this type endowed with some
additional structure transforms this collection into the category of Ω-sets.
Study of this additional structure is what we will do next.
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II. Intellectual function
"By itself, every intellectual object
is of course a set...
The relations between these sets
this is what we call "intellectual
essentially, mathematical function.
Kurpatov A. Methodology of thought.
We saw that intellectual objects are not some chaotic, messy collection,
but they form complex hierarchy, i. e. it is a highly structured collection
with many varied relationships found between it’s elements. Following the
author of the quotation given in the epigraph to this part of our study we
will call relation between intellectual objects intellectual function. According
to Kurpatov, the action of this intellectual function is the only instrument
of thought: "We operate endlessly with these operands (intellectual objects)
inside our own head producing in that way more and more relations between
them. These new relations are in fact new - derived from - intellectual
objects."31 And further: "When we say we are "looking for understanding"of
something, in reality we communicate our desire to create an intellectual
object which will be a solution to the problem we are occupied with at the
moment."32
Thus, our immediate goal is to outline some generalized space for the
consistent discourse, where we could control actions of intellectual function.
As a model of such generalized space we will examine a category - algebraic
structure loosely can be described as a collection of "objects"that are linked
by "arrows". 33
31Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 37
32Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 117
33https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_(mathematics)
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If we will think of the relation as a some oriented connection from one
object toward another, it seems quite natural then to assign letters A, B,
C... to intellectual objects, and arrows - to relations. It doesn’t mean though
that there can not be bilateral relations - but in such cases we will think
that there are two oriented connections between these two objects. And in
order for the rather vague concept of "relation"to give a more rigorous look
- of, albeit intellectual, but still a function, we will require that we could
formally manipulate with the arrows (relations)more or less like with the
ordinary mathematical functions: for instance, it would be convenient if we
could concatenate them together just as we do when adding numbers. Just as
the result of adding two numbers is a number, i. e. an element of the same set
where operation of addition has been determined, we might want the result
of concatenation of two arrows f and g (which is, by the way, customary to
call their composition and to denote g ◦ f) to be an arrow that also belongs
to given category.
To continue the analogy with the addition we will also require an analogue
of zero - so called identity arrow ( idA, or 1A), concatenation of which to any
other arrow (relation) does not change the result of the relation. There is
a slight difference though: since the arrow is determined not only by it’s
"internal nature but it is also important to specify where from and where to
given arrow is going, there has to be as many identity arrows as there are
objects in the category. And one more thing: as soon as in this case we add
not numbers, but "(inter)actions the order of actions is also very important:
hence, generally speaking, g ◦ f 6= f ◦ g. Respectively, when adding identity
arrow we must keep in control the side, which identity arrow is added to. In
other words, the fact that concatenation of identity arrow does not change
the result of the relation must be formalized as follows: for every relation
A
f−−→ B : f ◦ 1A = 1B ◦ f = f .
Here is an example of one of the simplest formal constructions which
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consists of only three objects, but which is still a category:
Notwithstanding identity arrow might seem "superfluous it serves a number
of important roles. For instance, it would be quite difficult to state formally
many basic categorial definitions - such as isomorphism of objects34, to name
one: two objects A and B in category C called isomorphic if there are two
arrows f : A→ B and g : B → A such as g ◦ f = 1A и f ◦ g = 1B.
Now let’s recall that the objectsA,B,C... which we want to "connect"with
the arrows are Heyting-valued sets and thereby they have quite rich structure
- actually, they themselves are the result of certain relation - relation of the
form f : A × A → Ω, to be precise. So, basically we must define functional
relationship r : A→ B,that in itself is the relation between relations, which
means that this type of connection must be additionally restricted, so that
these restrictions would take into account the internal structure of both set
A and set B.
If we will think of function ExpA : A × A → Ω as of encoding of
information about subject’s system of differentiations which she discovers
in the situation, it becomes quite obvious that relation r : A→ B also must
depend on this subject of experience Ω and must take into consideration
somehow this information. If r would be an arbitrary function it would simply
34In simple words, isomorphism is identity of structures. In not that simple words,
isomorphism is invertible morphism. (Morphism is another name for the arrow in
category.) That is, isomorphism is a type of relationship in which only objects very
similar in something can be.
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be a rule establishing correspondence between elements of sets A and B and
we could fix the fact of such correspondence as equality r(a) = b, where
a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Now, to stay strictly we could interpret this equality in
the same terms of expectation, i. e. to assign more or less high values q ∈ Ω
to all couples (r(a), b), depending on how r(a) close to b. Detailed formal
definition requires quite a lot of technical work35, but we will skip it here,
since category of complete Ω- sets allows for mush less technical and much
more meaningful interpretation.36 As we already mentioned relation between
intellectual objects must take into account the information contained in these
objects which can be basically reduced to certain system of differences and
identities. In other words, relation must respect the distribution of differences
and identities that has been already done by function of expectation Exp, i.
e. r : A → B can be represented as ordinary set theoretic function which
conserves all those differentiations and identities. It does not create anything
- neither increase identity of element with itself, nor increase it’s difference
from the others:
∀a, b ∈ A : EssBr(a) ≤ EssAa
ExpA(a, b) ≤ ExpB(r(a), r(b))
At last, we have a minimal set of instruments which we may use for
modeling of action of intellectual function as a process of building of more
and more complex intellectual objects. Andrey Kurpatov suggests to break
down this action into two large stages:
1. "On every level of mentality - from the elementary perception to the
most complex intellectual reasoning - one and the same intellectual function
35Look for details in Goldblatt R. (2006) Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. P. 277-278
36Borceux, F. (1994) Handbook of Categorical Algebra, volume 3, P.160. Why exactly space
of thought can and must be identified with the category of complete Ω- sets we will try
to substantiate below.
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of the forming (reproducing) of intellectual objects is performed. We identify
them as objects (from the variety of stimuli something is emerged - some
"thing") and then we correspond them with the rest of mental content (other
intellectual objects) which is already there."37
2. "Perceived "thing"(unit of thought) being subject to complexity - as if
it is raised to the power of those knowledge (intellectual objects) that we have,
and gets a corresponding value for us - considerable, in case there already
are many intellectual objects that being involved by our intellectual function
into this process of producing a new intellectual objects, and marginal, in
case there are no such intellectual objects in us, or they rendered irrelevant
by our intellectual function. 38
In the language of category theory these stages correspond to the following
categorial operations:
- Finding the categorial limit A of the piece of category that contains
the set of relevant intellectual objects, i. e. those which were involved by
intellectual function into the process of producing a new intellectual object
B ("perceived "thing").
- Exponentiation, or raising of perceived "thing"A to the power of B, i.
e. construction of so called exponential object BA, which, in turn, also can
be considered as categorial quasi-limit. 39
Important note. Usually, when we perform basic arithmetic operations -
for example, with integers - we are not bothered with the question why the
result of this or that operation exists at all, or "where"it exists. We take it for
granted that the result of addition, multiplication, subtraction or division of
numbers is also a number. Although even after subtracting a larger number
from a smaller number, people were not immediately able to ascribe any
meaning to the result they obtained. Strictly speaking, in order to find the
37Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 95-96
38Ibid. P. 96
39Badiou A. Mathematics of the Transcendental. N.Y. 2014, P. 49
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result of this operation within the same set of elements, it was necessary to
"throw in"negative numbers, as well as zero, into the known and familiar set
of natural numbers - in other words, in order not to leave the set, on which the
operation of subtraction is defined, and elements of which we call numbers. If,
in principle, some operation defined on the elements of a set does not take us
outside this set, then such a set is called closed under this operation. When
we introduced the operation of composition of arrows of the category we
encountered the same problem - we required that the result of "addition"of
two arrows in category would also belong to the category. Right now, when
we talk about taking the limit or constructing the exponential object, we also
need to make sure that these objects exist in our category. The category that
is closed under those two operations called cartesian closed.40. It has been
already mentioned earlier in another our work41 that in this way it is possible
to point out implicitly on the size of the category: if we use optical metaphor
then the category would be the bigger the more objects it has, from which
we can see different pieces of the category. In this sense given category of
Ω-sets is sufficiently large.
Categorial construction that includes the object C from which all other
objects of a given piece of category are "visible"called a cone. Piece of a
category in this case called a diagram. "Visibility formally speaking, means
existence of arrows which go from object C towards all objects of the diagram
so that every arrow of the diagram enters into the composition of an arrow
coming from C. In result the whole construction will commute, i. e. if there
is more then one way to reach one object from another, these ways are
equivalent, or interchangeable.
Given diagram may admit several different cones, so we will say that the
diagram admits the limit if there is the object C in the category, from which
40Badiou, A. Mathematics of the Transcendental. N.Y. 2014, P. 51
41Egorychev I. Categorical analysis of Kurpatov’s "Tractatus psychosophicus"in context
of AGI perspective developement"
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we see the diagram as closely as possible, i. e. if there is another object C1
from which the diagram is visible, then C is also visible from it.
It is quite evident that one can’t get all necessary relations (arrows) to
form the cone unless the limit object would have specific structure: indeed,
such object would contain all the information about given piece of category -
no more and no less. and in this particular sense the limit object is optimal.
Thereby finding of the limit object A for some diagram inside a category
is equivalent to construction of the heavy intellectual object, according to
Kurpatov - extension of our knowledge, relevant to the problem we are
working on at the moment, forming it into the "some thing"to the power
of which a newly discerned "thing"could be raised: "In fact, every single
action of intellectual function is further sophistication of intellectual objects.
That is in reality I does not just find some brand new relations between those
intellectual objects I already have, but rather form new intellectual objects
transforming into them a number of objects in question."42
It is very important to point here at the difference between diagram
as an arbitrary piece of category and subcategory - the latter, together
with relevant (intellectual) objects, comprise all! relations that exist between
them in the category. 43 And here lies a fundamental difference between
presentation and reconstruction. Kurpatov mentions on the subject: "When,
through the rupture of our representations, we see maximum possible number
of facts we are not perceiving anything particular, but rather something given
as a relation, and not as a relation between this and that, but as a result of
relation - essence of the relation. 44
That is, this probable absence of some, possibly, very important relations
(arrows) in the diagram is precisely what allows us to identify it both with our
representation in general, and with those essences, the representation consists




of. "Bringing the "essences"into its "objects"is normal and necessary practice
for our mind". "Relation is at the core: following our needs we enter into a
relationship with actual reality trying to satisfy somehow these needs. And
just as a result of these relations we form corresponding "essences"which,
ideally, will stay invariant for many different phenomena potentially capable
to satisfy one or another our need (want)."45 Pointing out on this deficit
of relations in the diagram that prevents to turn this piece of category into
subcategory, we thereby want to emphasize the biased nature of every mental
representation, its, so to speak, "utilitarian"character and, as a consequence
- inevitable distortion of reality by its constituent idiosyncratic entities’s
"gravity field".
So, we are dealing here with two radically different types of action of
intellectual function:
- exponentiation, which corresponds to the sophistication of intellectual
object B by means of raising it to the power of existent knowledge/representations
A;
- constructing of so called hom-functor HomC(−, B) which puts every
object A that belongs to subcategory C ⊆ Set (composed of relevant objects
of given diagram and supplemented with all missing relationships between
them) into correspondence with the set of all relations46 between object B
and object A.
Once again, we would like to draw attention to how different these two
actions are: while the exponential object is the object that lies in the initial
cartesian-closed catregory Ω−Set, hom-functor in fact embeds our subcategory
C ⊆ Ω− Set into another category of all sets Set that is significantly richer
both with objects and relations - which gives us opportunity to investigate
45Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 76
46In many categories arrows represent special kind of functions called homomorphisms
- a structure preserving maps. Hence, the name of the corresponding, specifically
constructed hom-functor
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given chunk of knowledge not in the isolation, but as a part of a much larger
network of relations, which usually can not be discerned from within the
initial category.
Moreover, the reconstruction of much higher level is possible - the one
that puts every intellectual object A of subcategory C in correspondence
with functor HomC(−, A) which contains allthe information about relations
of object A with every other object that lies in C. If this is the case, then
subcategory C will be embedded in even more saturated network of relations
resulted also from exponentiation of some sort - only in this particular case
category of all sets Set must be raised into the power of our subcategory
C! As a result we will get so called functor category, objects of which are all
functors from C to Set and arrows between them are natural transformations
of functors.47. Possibility of this construction is guaranteed by remarkable
mathematical result known as Yoneda embedding 48.




III. Thought: invariants and univelsalia
“Invariants are the "words"of
non-referential language.”
Kurpatov A. (From personal correspondence.)
So, we have just seen that mere sophistication of intellectual object rather
looks like representation then reconstruction and thereby does not guarantee
us the elimination from fragmentary and biased nature of the former: "Factual
reality can’t be given to us in representation, because represen tation is
always distorted by the agent who creates this representation... In fact, all
our representations of reality are value judgments, while the reality itself
could be only theoretically reconstructed."49
But how exactly in this case elimination from the aberrations of "reality
effect"created by every single representation of it, is possible in practice? In
other words, how reconstruction is possible? The answer, as it seems to us,
lies in following, remarkably deep idea, also delivered at due time by Andrey
Kurpatov: since intellectual objects are virtual machines, any hierarchy of
them has virtual, or we would rather say, conceptual character as well. This
purely abstract level, on which some particular intellectual object is seated,
even can be calculated at your wish by counting a number of those "Aha!-
effects"which were necessary for this intellectual object to form.
"We need to stop thinking of "levels"of thought and thereby to get
rid of delusions that arise because of this - Kurpatov insists. Differences
between various kinds (types) of intellectual objects that we discover mat
seem enormously huge: we have "feelings"here and "abstract numbers"there,
49Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 53
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they say, "physical regularities"here and "metaphysics of existence"there.
But all these are utterly insignificant for the thought as such. 50
Consequently, thought, supposedly constrained by specific content of at
times radically different contexts (remember once again the "slow gentle
force"of Lyell and Darwin), inside its own activity proves to be independent
of them. As Kurpatov wittily notes: "There is no problem for thought to
measure "feelings"with "abstract numbers or to find "metaphysical specificity"
in "physical regularities". 51
The freedom of thought thus obtained brings us to the most important
concept of the methodology: that of invariant - extremely important instrument
of thought which allows us to think disregarding specificity of particular
contents.
As soon as thought is the process of construction of more complex intellectual
objects from more simple ones carried out by intellectual function, then
invariant also has to be an intellectual object of some sort. But what sort?
We already mentioned above that virtual machine of mind can’t work in
isolation - it needs certain ecosystem where other auxiliary virtual machines
can be uploaded. In this sense human brain essentially depends on society
and on presence of language in it, which is the main instrument of building
of such ecosystem: vast amount of knowledge coded in a form of texts,
charts, schemes etc. uploads into the environment. However, it is by no
means necessary for the virtual machine of general intelligence to be linguistic
machine - moreover, in case of artificial intelligence such a restraint would
seem probably too "artificial". But equally probable that it would be almost
impossible to implement brain principles programming without one or the
other quite elaborated system of symbols.
It means that we need to supply our cartesian closed category (which
50Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 92
51Ibid. P. 92-93
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from now on we will consider a "world of representations or "my scheme of
the world"in terms of "Tractatus") with some quasi-linguistic structure - a
special system of signs, or names which can then be effectively (and what is
most important - disregarding specificity of particular contents) used by any
user who would thereby be able to deconstruct his or her representations and
to theoretically reconstruct factual reality with the help of suitable invariants
created individually for the specific tasks.
At the core of this process lies our ability to classify things. As A. Kurpatov
wrote: "A "table"serves us as invariant as well as a "face"(or a "cup"or any
thing of that sort): anything we can assign the function of the table to can
be identified as a "table while any thing we can assign the function of the
face to can be identified as a "face although this thing in fact may not be the
face". 52
Actually, pretty common procedure has been described here which we
carry out constantly without even thinking what we doing: for instance, I
can’t add "tables"to "chairs"or "pears"to "apples"unless I bring them to the
common denominator "furniture"or "fruits". "Furniture"and "fruits"in their
turn are also don’t "marry"each other so well unless they will be grasped
by common concept of "objects"while "objects"and, let’s say, "feelings"can’t
be perceived as something even remotely "similar"before I start to think of
them as of "things". The certainty that is lost in the process of such an ascent
and the freedom thus gained at the same time, are both perfectly captured
in English with the help of indefinite article: a cat is not this or that cat, it
is any cat whatsoever.
But it’s still not enough - in order to disregard referentiality we need such
a system of symbols where there is no a single signifier would correspond to
any thing in my scheme of the world. That is why from now on we will
proceed from important methodological assumption: invariant is a floating
52Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 75
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signifier.53.
It is very important to note here that different "users"(subjects of knowledge)
would necessarily have different signifiers which they chose to play role of
invariants, because the latter essentially depend on modus of existence of
particular user (class of users) - they will be "colored"by this modus of
existence, so to speak.
Invariants are what allows the knowers to reconstruct something regardless
of who exactly uses them: human, machine, alien, amoeba. Universalia, on
the other hand, are what gives reality its certain positive characteristics
depending on how this particular knower is organized. In other words, while
invariants are invariant for all beings, universalia are universal (invariant) for
this or that particular being (knower).
This is what A. Kurpatov writes on the subject: "We think by means
of these universalia - big and small, heavy and distant, thin and complex,
empty and huge, bright and strong, singular and multiple, heap and couple,
tall and powerful, petty and insignificant, abundant and overfull, fast and
slow, continuous and instant, space and territory, zone and region [S. Pinker].
In other words, it is our modus of organizing things: our objects, and all of
them are intellectual, are given to us that way - they are the way they are
by default. 54
Notoriously famous concepts of Yin and Yang, I think, colud provide
good examplificaion of invariants: maximally derived from referentiality these
principles exhibit themselves as soft and hard, male and female, light and
dark, weak and strong, submission and domination etc. Interestingly enough
that concepts of "strength "female "light"or "submission"themselves can be
considered as invariants of certain level, depending on purposes they are used.
In this "metasense"concept of "universalia"also could be thought as one of
53https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floating_signifier
54Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 110-111
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the invariants.
That is, we always will understand invariant in two senses:
- in narrow sense - as in cases of the concepts "a cat"or "Yin when
individual instantiations do not change the concept;
- in a broad sense - as an methodological instrument of reconstruction of
reality, independent of particular knower by definition.
It is clear that in the latter case we can not know in advance whether
this or that floating signifier will prove to be invariant or not. We only can
verify it "empirically so to speak: if both I and, let’s say, a computer will get
equivalent models of reality, then both I and "her"used invariants, which will
work as such in this case strictly by definition.
To sum up all’ve been just said, in order to model the world of intellectual
function correctly, we will need to supplement our structure with the flexible
system of signifiers using which any user could change more or less freely
its hierarchical order and to define them through each other depending on
the problem that is being solving at the moment. What kind of signifier
will be chosen specifically as invariant will also depend on the domain where
the problem was posited: "Every area of expertise is determined... by its
own specific "entities"which, in their turn, have their own logic of relations
and specific limitations appropriate to this area. That’s why every such
"private"area would require specific invariants, which, most likely, couldn’t be
expressed otherwise then in specific, complementary to this area universaia.l55
There is one more quite important moment: just mentioned flexibility
of the system of signifiers brings with it a number of potential costs. In
particular, a freedom gained through such flexibility resurrects so called
"the theoretician’s dilemma"well known in methodology of science - thesis
that problematize both the role of the theoretical terms in scientific theory
and of concepts with so called "unobservable entities"as their referents. In
55Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 172
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other words, in extreme we obtain an instrument symbolic resources of which
threaten to significantly exceed existential resources of being. After all, neither
the famous dialectic principle of the unity and conflict of opposites nor any
other arbitrarily pretentious axiomatics founded by such invariant beliefs as,
let’s say, "All is ashes"or “Tis love, that makes the world go round"are in no
way inferior to our example of Yin and Yang.
Kurpatov repeatedly emphasizes that in the essence of any area of expertise
or practice we must discover something real - something that is really exists.
He is deeply convicted that we can’t build a working methodology based on
such concepts as "god "ethics"or "history because with all desire we won’t
be able to answer the question: "What is it really?"In this sense invariants
"intellectual object"and "intellectual function"are rather observable because
at least in principle could be reduced to the "real machine"of neural assembles,
logic of their connections and transmission of nerve impulses.
Thus, strictly methodologically speaking, invariants can and must describe
what really is, while universalia describe how it is to someone (in relation
with someone).
It was exactly the latter important moment that was successfully formalized
in such algebraic construction as Heyting-valued set. In it, we recall, the
subject of experience is "grasped"in two aspects - in respect to primordial
differentiating ability, i. e. only as a Heyting lattice Ω, and as a result of
relation, i. e. as a thing ("the world that presented itself to me as me in
this particular way")Ω = (Ω,ExpΩ : Ω × Ω → Ω).56. We wrote above
that conditions imposed on function of expectation allow for considerable
variability of the latter, however this variability vanishes when we construct
56For details see: Egorychev I. Categorical analysis of Kurpatov’s "Tractatus
psychosophicus"in context of AGI perspective developement"
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Ω as Heyting-valued set - this function must be defined in a unique way
ExpΩ(p, q) =def p⇔ q (1)
Operation of equivalence ⇔ that has been just introduced is derived
operation on Heyting lattice, and corresponds corresponds, as expected of
equivalence, to two implications,i.e. p ⇔ q =def (p ⇒ q) ∧ (q ⇒ p), where
implication p ⇒ q in its turn is short notation for so called relative pseudo
complement p⇒ q =def
⋃
x∈Ω
{x : p∧x ≤ q}. We remind that when "absolute"
pseudocomplement is a topological analogue and convenient generalization
of negation in logic, relative pseudocomplement is a generalization of logical
connective "if, then..."(To advanced readers we suggest to check themselves
that absolute pseudocomplement really is a pseudocomplement relative to ∅,
or minimal element of Heyting lattice.)
It means, as we already mentioned before, that having at our disposal a
srtucture with partial order and a number of "order"analogues of set theoretic
operations of intersection and union ( ∧ и ∨ - greatest lower and least upper
bound, or meet and join)57 makes possible for us to mirror almost completely
the structures of rationality as such.
So, informally, formula (1) only says that elements are close to each other
to the extent that they are equivalent. Or, to put it differently, two elements
are maximally close, only if they are equal. Which might probably look
tautological, in a sense, but it can’t be otherwise. Indeed, degree of proximity
of two elements that belong to "me as a thing"which simultaneously serve as
the marks of my differentiating scale, i. e. values of the scale itself must be
such that the structure of me as a subject of experience would remain intact.
57Randomness of the structures that only partially ordered can be increased indefinitely.
Condition for any two elements having greatest lower and least upper bounds guarantees
that randomness of our existential ruler won’t be too large. For details see: Egorychev
I. Language of category theory and "the limits of the world". SPb. 2018, P. 28
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From such rigid and quite tricky from technical point of view specification of
the function ExpΩ, however, follows everything we need58: and in particular,
that the proximity of an element р to its own "essence"is always maximal,
that is EssΩ(p) = >. Curiously enough, given property can be interpreted
so that I cannot doubt that something seems to me different and how different
this something seems to me - just as Descartes once discovered the doubtlessness
of his own doubt, so do we, following him, may postulate: "I discriminate,
therefore I am."
In "Categorial analysis of "Tractatus"and in more detail in "Commentaries
to "Analysis"we have already expressed the general idea of how a category,
which at the same time is a topos, manifests a much richer structure, which
has a distinctively logical (symbolic) character. Moreover, this manifested
"internal logic of topos"generally is not Boolean one, and depends, generally
speaking, on which particular topos we are considering (in fact, that is why
this logic is called internal). Despite the fact that above is true for every topos
as Cartesian-closed category with subobject classifier, a world of intellectual
function considered as category of Heyting-valued sets will have a number of
important distinctive features, which we will now study in more detail.
So called Ω-axiom is formulated in exact correspondence with our intuitive
view that in order to single out in a given object A a certain part i of it we
need to point on some attribute pii which we will use for specification of that
part - and for that, in turn, we will need signifiers (signs, symbols, names):
for any subobject i : B → A there exist unique arrow pii : A → Ω such
that following diagram commutes:







If in a category C there exists an object Ω satisfying given axiom, then
together with an arrow true : 1 → Ω this C -object is called a subobject
classifier, or a truth value object. 59 A truly remarkable fact is that in the
category of Heyting-valued sets such object really exists and, moreover, it
turns out to be a Heyting valued set Ω = (Ω,ExpΩ : Ω× Ω→ Ω)!60.
It follows from what has been said, first, that the world of intellectual
function is really a topos. And second, the role of subobject classifier that
is the role of an instrument which is used, from the one hand, to single out
in any intellectual object any part of it and, from the other hand, to name
every singe part, is played by Ω itself. It means that not only the world of
intellectual function is structured by my (non-convertible) values (meanings),
but I act in it as the "measure of all things or truth value object. Formally
it can be put as follows:
∀A ∃θA : SubC(A) ∼= HomC(A,Ω),
i. e. for every object A is true that to each of its subobjects some name
corresponds, and different subobjects correspond to different names (symbols).
In other words, for every intellectual object as well as for every arbitrarily
small part of it we get sought ramified and flexible system of signifiers, which
is much more convenient to operate with. And as soon as there is a natural
59Object of category C is called terminal if from any other object of category C toward
this object there is only one arrow. Subobject is a categorial analogue and generalization
of set-theoretic notion of a part, or subset.
60Goldblatt R. Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. N.Y., 2006, P. 277
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isomorphism between the parts of objects and the names (propositions) that
are used for specification of those parts (remember that every object at the
same time is its own part), both when taking limits and when exponentiating,
a completely controlled conversion from objects to their signifiers and back
is possible.
And, finally, third: let’s try to understand how the procedure of signification
is carried out in the category of Geyting-valued sets. In "Categorial analysis
of "Tractatus"we said that by predicate pi(x) : B → Ω it is most natural
to understand a function which associates every element x of set B with
some degree of its proximity to the attribute expressed by given predicate,
or a certain truth value on the scale Ω - a degree to which the proposition
"element x has property pi"is true (according to our current interpretation
- the subjective measure of our expectation of how fully a given element x
will exhibit a given property pi“) Hence, sometimes it is customary to denote
maximal element of the scale as > (true), and minimal - as ⊥ (false). Let’s
not forget that we gain much more freedom than in two-valued logic due to
the presence of intermediate, and often incomparable truth values in Heyting
algebra Ω.
Since B is not just a set, but an object of our category (B = (B,ExpB)),
it is naturally to demand from predicate function to be consistent with those
expectation values that depend on the function ExpB. In particular:
- it is impossible for an element x to exhibit a certain quality (property)
and at the same time to "look like"another element y in a degree higher than
a degree of exhibition of that quality by the element y : pi(x) ∧ ExpB(x, y) ≤
pi(y);
- it is impossible for an element x to exhibit a particular quality (property)
in a degree higher than a degree of manifestation of it’s own essence: pi(x) ≤
EssB(x).
If we add to these two conditions the third one:
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- pi(x)∧pi(y) ≤ ExpB(x, y) (which means that a degree in which elements
x and y at the same time exhibit quality pi, can not be higher than a degree of
proximity of those elements), then we will see that given predicate pi singles
out in object B the part with no more than one element exhibiting the
property pi with maximal degree. Indeed, if pi(x) ∧ pi(y) = >, it follows that
ExpB(x, y) = >, i. e. such х and у are identical!
Such "atomic"part is a Heyting-valued analogue of subset consisting of
one element x and called singleton. Accordingly, it is natural to call a respective
signifier, or predicate function pi which satisfies to these all three conditions,
also a singleton, or atomic signifier.
Now recall that the function of expectation ExpA : A×A→ Ω assigns to
every pair x, y ∈ A a certain degree of their coherence q on Heyting algebra
Ω. If we’ll keep one element of the pair fixed (let it be x = a, for instance), this
function wil turn into ostensive definition - it will be function of one variable
that assigns to every element x ∈ A a degree of it’s proximity to fixed element
a. Such function is a predicate - in this case we express the property pi by
pointing at the particular representative a, or at some archetypal exhibitor,
so to speak, of the property in question as if to say thereby: "it is like that a-
we will call it ostensive predicate and denote as a(x). Moreover, this function
will be atomic by obvious reasons.
Correspondingly, Heyting-valued set A is called complete Ω-set, if all its
singletons are of the form a(x) for some unique a ∈ A. 61
And now attention, the most important: remember - we said above that
by invariants must be described somthing that really exists. But what is this
if not the requirement of completeness of Ω-set A: at least atomic signifiers
must point at some thing that exists in reality. So we argue that taking
into account what has already been said above it would be the most correct
and the most appropriate to describe the world of intellectual function as
61Goldblatt R. Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. N.Y., 2006, P. 388
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a subcategory in category of complete Ω-sets, which from now on we will
denote as CΩ-Set.
As we already mentioned, in category CΩ-Set many objects and relations
could be defined in more graphic and direct manner. That was particularly
the case with the definition of arrows: instead of quite awkward and technical
construction in the world of intellectual function we agreed to call a relation
a function r : A→ B defined on usual sets, such that:
∀a, b ∈ A : EssB(r(a)) ≤ EssA(a)
ExpA(a, b) ≤ ExpB(r(a), r(b))
From these two conditions immediately follows that EssA(a) = EssB(r(a)).
That is, when engaged in a relation an element a of the set A remains
close to its own essence in the same degree that preceded such engagement.
Conditions of this kind are called conservative which means that relation as
a function conserves (does not change, leaves intact) initial distribution of
values on Heyting lattice that have been made by the function of expectation
- it respects them.
Now let’s examine in more detail some other important constructions in
CΩ-Set.
We’ll start with terminal object. Earlier we defined a terminal object as
marked object of category C such that there is only one arrow into this object
from any other object in C.62 It is denoted as 1, because in the category
of sets it corresponds to singleton - one element set {x}. Examination of
constitution of terminal object in category CΩ-Set is of interest, also because
this relatively simple example is a very graphic illustration of how greatly
62Almost every important categorial construction allows for its dual - which may be
obtained from the initial construction n by reversing all its arrows. Such dual to terminal
object is so called initial object which has exactly one arrow from it into any another
object of the category.
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formally identical categorial constructions can differ in different categories.
The specific of Ω-set’s construction plus conditions imposed on arrows
in the world of intellectual function imply those specific restrictions that
organize the shape of terminal object in it: so it’s almost no surprise that the
role of terminal object 1 in this case will be played again (as in the case of
the truth value object) by subject of experience Ω together with the function
of expectation defined as Exp1(p, q) = p ∧ q. Due to existent restrictions on
arrows there willbe exactly one arrow into this complete Ω-set from any other
Ω-set A that assigns to each a ∈ A the degree of its essence Ess(a) ∈ Ω.
By the way, an element a ∈ A such that Ess(a) = >, we will agree
to call a global element. In this context it is also make sense to consider
another function which sends all elements a ∈ A into the minimal element
µ in Ω. 63 This function will be a singleton (see the definition above), but
it means that in intellectual object A, which is a complete Heyting-valued
set, as we remember, there must be a unique element ∅A ∈ A such that
∀x ∈ A ExpA(x,∅A) = µ. In particular, EssA(∅A) = µ. Such element of the
intellectual object A we will call its inexistent. And then the initial object in
the world of intellectual function will be the object 0 = ({µ},Exp0(µ, µ) = µ)
with the unique for every other object A of given category CΩ-Set arrow
0→ A that assigns to the element µ an inexistent ∅A ∈ A.
We will return to inexistent of intellectual object shortly, yet for now we
have everything prepared to examine in detail the construction of exponential
object BA, which corresponds to elaboration of the intellectual object B by
raising it to the power of existent knowledge/representations A. Let’s not
forget that both А and В are complete Ω-sets right now and that we’re
working in appropriate category CΩ-Set.
What exactly we expect from this kind of object after all? We want it to
63Before we denoted minimal element of lattice Ω as ⊥, or "false but now it is worth
emphasizing graphically that it is really minimal possible (actually, nil, or zero) degree
of existence.
45
play a role of a container of sorts filled with signifiers which would effectively
name all possible relations of the form А → В. That’s why we called
this construction "quasi-limit since we are really looking inside the world
of intellectual function for such an intellectual object that would effectively
represent all those relations (parametrize them "perfectly"). Random choice
of object X most likely will fail to do the job in that X may not have
appropriate signifier (concept) to express a particular relation, or there may
be several different names (signifiers) that express the same relation.
As a simple example of such "suboptimal"object X we can consider a
set of buttons of a pocket calculator with the names of functions inscribed
on them, for instance: X = {+,−,×,÷, log,√}, and to take the sets of
numbers as objects A and B. Then our operations with calculator can be
formally reduced to input of a number and a name of an action (function)
which we would like to perform, i.e. a pair of the form (a, f) from the set
A×X and getting a value f(a) = b ∈ B as an output. Obviously, there will
be many more relations between sets A and B then there are buttons on any
calculator: generally speaking, there are exactly |B||A| functions from set A
to set B - vertical lines here denote that we take into account quantitative
aspect of respective sets, i. e. a number of elements in them. This is, by the
way, another reason why the metaphor of "raising one object into the power
of another"is quite apt in this case. However, it’s not enough to know the
number of relations between A and B - otherwise we could just enumerate
them. But from exponential object we expect the names of relations that are
meaningful - we are looking for notions in it that would conceptually grasp
those relations and adequately express them. That’s why we may say that
exponential object contains not only bare names but also the arrows of the
form А→ В as the result of relations.
Hence, the formal definition is the following: exponential (exponential
object) of two objects A and B is object BA together with the evaluation
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arrow (morphism) ev : BA ×A→ B such that for every other object C and
every arrow g : C × A → B there exist unique arrow gˆ : C → BA which
makes the following diagram commute:
It is curious that the arrow gˆ is also called the name of the arrow g.
Object C here plays the role of that "suboptimal"X which lacks some names
or, on the contrary, contains equivocal names. The presence of the arrow
gˆ : C → BA informally indicates on symbolic resources powerful just enough
to clarify every ambiguity replacing it, so to speak, with canonical names
contained in BA.
This is the general case. Yet in the world of intellectual function this
object, as might be expected, gains its own additional specific character.
Since by world of intellectual function we agreed to understand a category
of complete Heyting-valued sets, then on the relations themselves, i.e. on the
elements g ∈ BA as well we need to define both the function of expectation
and, as a consequence, the measure of their "trustworthines"EssBA(g). That
is why in the category CΩ-Set it is convenient to define the exponential
object as the set of pairs of the form 〈g, p〉, where g : А → В is a relation
(arrow) in given category and p ∈ Ω. The function of expectation ExpBA(〈g, p〉, 〈g′, q〉)
is defined so that EssBA(〈g, p〉) = p. This is done in the following, quite
specific way:
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ExpBA(〈g, p〉, 〈g′, q〉) =
⋂
x∈A
(EssA(x)⇒ ExpA(g(x), g′(x))) ∧ p ∧ q
Note that in this interpretation, only global elements of the set BA, i. e.
ordered pairs of the form 〈g,>〉 are true arrows (relations) in CΩ-Set, since,
according to the definition just introduced, EssBA(〈g,>〉) = > - and it makes
sense to consider all other arrows 〈g, p〉 as some hypostatized bonds which are
there (between objects А and В) only with a certain degree of expectation
p ∈ Ω that was predicted by the subject of experience Ω. In effect, exponential
object, defined in this way, contains both true and apparent relations, which
perfectly models the work of an intellectual function as an elaboration of
intellectual object, where the latter is not always a reconstruction, but could
remain just an elaboration of our representation.
Yoneda embedding is devoid of this disadvantage - or, perhaps, we would
rather say - of this distinctive feature, because it "forgets"about any arrows
in the category except the true ones , by its very construction. Detailed
examination of this construction. The last chapter The Yoneda Passion"of
our recent work "Language of category theory and "the limits of the world"64
is devoted to a detailed examination of this construction. For now we will
only outline basic principles for constructing Yoneda embedding, making
appropriate and necessary emphasis on the existing parallels with the metho-
dology of thought.
So, a functor HomC(−, B) : C → Set puts into correspondence to every
object A of category C the set of arrows from A to B. It means that on the
face of it it must be an exponential BA that is put into correspondence with
an object A, but exponential is the object of the category C, while a functor
acts into the category of sets. That is why, when constructing the former
64Egorychev I. Language of category theory and "the limits of the world". SPb. 2018
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we had to take into account the internal structure of category C, whereas
in this sense there is no any specific structure on Set. Actually, we could
define exponential also as a functor (−)A : C → C which acts from category
C into itself (it is called endofunctor in such case)). So, to put it differently,
we could say that constructing of exponential is "internal"exponentiation,
whereas constructing of Yoneda functor is exponentiating "externally".
Please, note that a functor is an analogue of function defined on categories
rather then sets. But since, unlike in ordinary sets, there are such "elements"as
arrows in category, in order to define functor correctly we must set a rule for
their correspondence as well. This rule arises quite naturally: if in category
C there is an arrow f between objects A and B then a functor F : C → D
puts it in correspondence with the arrow in category D that goes from and
to those objects into which objects A and B were sent by the same functor
F (they called images of A and B in D under action of F ). And of course,
such a correspondence must respect the basic category structure, i. e. image
of an arrow which is the result of composition of two arrows in category C
should be equal with the result of composition of their images in D :
F (f ◦ g) = F (f) ◦ F (g)65
To put it more simply, the rule F is functorial, if it agrees on arrows.
Correspondingly, there are may be quite many of such functorial rules
acting from category C to category Set and among them are just mentioned
functors of the form: HomC(−, B) : C → Set. But then, just as in case of
exponential object BA, elements of which in general were arrows f : A →
B we might want to consider another object, elements of which would be
65If this icdentity holds, then a rule F is called covariant functor. If slightly different
identity holds, namely F (f ◦ g) = F (g) ◦ F (f), then functor F is called contravariant.
Sometimes they say that contravariant functor "reverses"arrows, since it puts in
correspondence with an arrow from X to Y in category C an arrow from F (Y ) to
F (X) in category D.
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functors F : C → Set. It turns out that such an object really exists and,
moreover, it is a category, which by obvious reasons called functor category.
It means, in particular, that functors are objects of this category, and that
means that there must exist appropriately defined arrows between them. Such
arrows between functors are called natural transformations and we examined
their construction in detail in our book "Language of category theory and
"the limits of the world"mentioned earlier. But now it is quite another aspect
that is important. It turns out that from any category C 66 into such functor
category SetC it’s possible to construct a functor which every object A ∈ C
sends to some object in category SetC , namely, a functor HomC(−, A) which
in our case, when C ⊆ CΩ-Set, is - attention, please! -a set of all relations of
intellectual object A with every other intellectual object of category C. And
since a relation in a world of intellectual function we defined as ordinary
set theoretic function with some additional constrains, a set of all relations
between object A and B won’t contain anything else except such set theoretic
functions which are exactly global elements of exponential object in the world
of intellectual function, i. e. relations that truly exist.
Finally, it only remains to add that just mentioned functor = : C → SetC
is precisely a famous Yoneda embedding and it is of interest for us as well
because the set of all relations between any two objects A and B in the
world of intellectual function turns out to be naturally isomorphic to the set
of all natural transformations between corresponding functors HomC(−, A)
and HomC(−, B). If we denote these hom functors, correspondingly as hA
and hB, the statement we just made can be written as follows:
66To be perfectly accurate we needed to say: from any locally small category for a collection
of arrows from A to B must constitute a set, since elements of Set are sets. (A category
is called locally small if, for any pair of objects A and B, the class of morphisms from A
to B is a set. Some authors assume this condition as part of the definition of a category.)
However, for the purposes of our study such subtleties are not essential.
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∀A,B ∈ C ⊆ CΩ-Set =A,B : HomC(A,B) ∼= Nat(hA, hB)
In terms of A. Kurpatov’s methodology of thought it means that reconstruction
of the world of intellectual function is really possible.
Let’s try to understand what exactly the above natural isomorphism
means.
The basic idea consists in that when we substitute each intellectual object
with the set of all relations it is engaged in with all other intellectual objects
and begin to examine these sets as some autonomous objects, then we, on the
one hand, do not loose any information about original objects, and, on the
other hand, such shift in representation of the world of intellectual function
does not import any additional relations or any other types of connections
(bonds) into it. But at the same time if before we were limited by uniqueness
of representation as by cocoon, now our world of intellectual function turned
out to be embedded into a much richer structure which constitutes category
SetCΩ-Set (or it’s arbitrary subcategory) - for among intellectual objects
А, В, С which belong to the wold of intellectual function there are "other
people i. e. new subjects of experience Ω′, Ω′′, Ω′′′ etc. In our "Commentaries
to "Tractatus"we already pointed out on the deepest connection between the
set of parts of SubC(A) any object A and the set of signifiers HomC(A,Ω)
which is expressed with so called representability 67 of the set of parts of any
object A of category C by unique object of the same category, namely Ω. Since
it is true for any Ω whatsoever, it means exactly that functors hΩ′ , hΩ′′ , hΩ′′′
etc. contain all the information about how, at least at the level of signifiers,
Others (other subjects of experience) label reality.
In our book "Language of category theory and "the limits of the world"we
commented on this very important theoretical result as follows: "... we’ve got
67For details see: Egorychev I. Language of category theory and "the limits of the world".
SPb. 2018, P. 97-98
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rigorous and accurate way to represent a certain unknown and isolated part
of reality as something familiar..., and second, to immerse it into much more
elaborated and also known context which nevertheless have always existed,
since SetC
op
essentially depends on how the objects of C are related and
builds on this information. It means that we have at our disposal a tool with
which we can make implicit and unknown relations explicit and to some
extent known - and this is extremely important epidemiological result."68
One more aspect of the language of category theory that never ceases to
marvel, is it’s mathematical scrupulous rigor with which the original system
of relations can be "dragged"into arbitrary level of abstraction. And now we
will attempt to show with all necessary details that such rigor is achieved by
following basically the one and the same iterated functoriality rule.
Let’s see how this rule is realized using the example of the action of two
functors hA and hB .
The rule hA acts from category C to Set, putting into correspondence
with every object X in С the set of all relations between this object X and
fixed object A. Functoriality here would mean that if there exist a relation f
between objects X any Y in category C, then this relation should correspond
to some other function f ∗ (dependent on f ), which must be a relation between
sets of relations HomC(X,A) и HomC(Y,A) in Set, such that it would make





It is easy to notice that such f ∗ really exists - every relation g ∈ HomC(Y,A)
68Egorychev I. Language of category theory and "the limits of the world". SPb. 2018, P.
111-112
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it sends to composition g ◦ f ∈ HomC(X,A) (notice also that in process an










then we will clearly understand how this rule hA should act on arrows:
hA(f) = f
∗ : l→ l ◦ f = k
hA(g) = g
∗ : m→ m ◦ g = l
hA(g ◦ f) = (g ◦ f)∗ : m→ m ◦ (g ◦ f) = (m ◦ g) ◦ f = l ◦ f = k
From the other hand, we see that f ∗ ◦ g∗ : m → m ◦ g → m ◦ g ◦ f = k.
Consequently, (g ◦f)∗ = f ∗ ◦g∗, which means that hA(g ◦f) = hA(f)◦hA(g).
That is images of arrows has been reversed indeed, since commuting





And, thereby hA is contravariant functor.
But Yoneda embedding also acts one more floor up putting into correspondence
with every object A in category C just examined functor hA. Strictly speaking,
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situation that has just been examined is called a contravariant case of Yoneda
embedding and formally should be written slightly different: = : C → SetCop ,
where Cop denotes precisely a category C with reversed arrows (from English
word opposite)69.Embedding = itself in this case already will be covariant as
a functor, which we will now try to demonstrate.
By the way, we could depict functoriality differently. We could say that
hA is contravariant functor if it maps every arrow f : Y → X of category







Now, the situation with embedding is quite different: we must show that
Yoneda functor = maps an arrow h : A → B into an arrow α : hA → hB













It is important to keep in mind that functor hA is not just an the object
of the category, but the object with the structure which it inherited, as we
69That’s why exactly this symbol emerged a little earlier in our quote above.
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remember, from original category C. In our case given object constitutes a
set of sets of relations HomC(X,A),HomC(Y,A),HomC(Z,A)... and relations
f ∗, g∗ etc. between these sets already have been fully agreed upon as well.
As soon as this agreement must be maintained on arbitrary high floors of
abstraction, the law of correspondence between functors which is called their
natural transformation also must satisfy functoriality condition. But now
not just one arrow but rather whole family of arrows {αX : HomC(X,A) →
HomC(X,B)}X∈C should correspond to an arrow h : A → B in such way
that for every relation f : X → Y αX ◦ f ∗ = f ∗ ◦ αY .
It’s also easy to notice that, just as the last time, such family of arrows
(we can denote it as −∗) can be found quite "naturally it will be comprised
of functions of the form h∗, where each one of them maps every relation





Naturality of this transformation means that the arrangement of every
component of given family is invariant and do not depend on choice of the
object X ∈ C.
If we look again at the identity depicted on the Diagram 1.1 which is
sometimes called the axiom of naturality70, then we notice that in our case
it is also true that h∗(f ∗(g)) = h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f = f ∗(h∗(g)), i. e. the
diagram commutes and, consequently, the axiom of naturality holds.
Moreover, it is not too hard to check, that once we have a system of
relations:









then each component of the transformation −∗ is functorial, that is:
(f ◦ h)∗ = f ◦ h ◦ k = m = f ◦ l = f ◦ l ◦ l = f ◦ l ◦ h ◦ k = f∗ ◦ h∗
So, Yoneda functor maps every object A of category C to the functor
hA ∈ SetCop and every relation h : A → B - to the natural transformation
h∗ : hA → hB each component of which, in it’s turn, is functorial.
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Conclusion
The world of intellectual function, realized formally as category of
complete Heyting-valued sets allows at least for two more important formal
procedures (besides exponentiation and Yoneda embedding that have been
just examined) that could also be understood manifestly gnoseologically:
the first one implies a radical transformation of function of expectation
ExpA inside the intellectual object A := (A,ExpA). Such transformation
can be implemented by joining to the supporting set A the set A itself. This
procedure, generally speaking, are forbiden in ZFC axiomatic set theory 71,
but ontological consequences of such paradoxical joining are so significant
that we believe we have the right to consider them at least theoretically.
The second procedure heavily rest upon the fact that category of complete
Heyting-valued sets is a Grothendieck topos and categorically equivalent to
category of sheaves over Heyting algebra (over site) Ω. This procedure was
once investigated by French philosopher Alain Badiou, and, in particular,
the axiom of gluing an arbitrary functor must satisfy in order to be a sheaf72
was interpreted by Badiou as possibility of a world to be thinkable for the
Subject.
Both procedures require a fairly thorough mathematical background, but
their potential usefulness for the varieties of implementations of Artificial
Intelligence models based on Kurpatov’s BPP (Brain Principles Programming)
are definitely worth the efforts to gain such background. So, we, for our part,
are willing to continue detailed examination both of these procedures and of
71The fact that no set can be an element of itself is the one of the consequences of axiom
of regularity in ZFC.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_regularity for details.
This restriction helped mathematicians, in particular, to eliminate the paradoxes of
"naive"set theory, formulated by Georg Cantor, which arose there now and then
because of akin autoreferentiality ( Russell paradox beeng the most famous among these
paradoxes of this class.
72See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gluing_axiom
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